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Existence precedes and rules essence. 
Sartre, J.P. (1943) Being and Nothingness 
 
In this chapter, we review behavioral 
research connecting affective embodiment and 
evaluative cognition. We argue that affect and 
belief exist in a dynamic relationship. Evaluative 
beliefs elicit affective experience, and affective 
experience provides data for evaluative 
conception. We propose that such reciprocal 
relationships exist because emotions are, in part, 
embodiments of evaluation. That is, emotions 
exist when the same goodness or badness is 
represented simultaneously in multiple systems. 
Indeed, emotion is arguably nothing but the co-
occurrence of evaluation in thought, feeling, 
physiology, expression, and so on. The 
embodied nature of some of these 
representations makes evaluative beliefs 
especially compelling. Thus, in contrast to a 
mere idea that something may be good or bad in 
some way, an emotion is an embodied 
commitment to such a reality. 
Our general research program focuses on the 
idea that embodied affective reactions act as 
critical information for making judgments, 
guiding cognitive processing, and selecting 
events to remember. However, in this chapter we 
focus on how such embodiment serves to 
validate or invalidate evaluative beliefs. We also 
suggest that the impact of an idea in art often 
depends on its ability to elicit embodied 
reactions, that is, its ability to move people. 
The experience of emotion has two 
discriminable components – valence and arousal 
(Barrett, this volume; Russell, 2003). In turn, 
these components are embodied representations 
of value and importance (Clore & Schnall, 
2005). The embodiment is evident not only in 
the experience of affective feelings but 
presumably also in the neurochemistry upon 
which such experiences rest. For example, 
valence might be marked by dopamine release 
(Knutson, Adams, Fong, & Hommer, 2001) and 
arousal by adrenaline production (e.g., Cahill & 
McGaugh, 1998). If so, such biochemical and 
experiential events are both parts of an embodied 
understanding of the world. They represent what 
people care about, including what people hope 
for, sacrifice for, and vote for, as well as what 
they crave, cry over, regret, and are embarrassed 
by. 
Even everyday decisions are made on the 
basis of anticipated emotion (Baumeister, Vohs, 
& Tice, 2006). We decide on one course of 
action rather than another because some portion 
of relevant affect or emotion is elicited at the 
prospect of taking that path. Thus, we imagine 
that we will be pleased at having chosen a 
particular option. We choose investments that 
seem likely to yield reward and unlikely to lead 
to disappointment. We choose partners that seem 
likely to make us happy and effective, vacations 
that appear to offer more enjoyment than hassle, 
and restaurants that we believe will be enjoyable 
and satisfying. We choose whether to have a 
medical procedure based on whether we 
anticipate being glad we did so in the long run. 
Thus, although thinking may be for acting, 
action itself is motivated by embodied 
perceptions and anticipations of the good, the 
bad, and the important. 
Embodied Validation of Beliefs 
In this section, we examine one cognitive 
consequence of being moved. We propose that 
affective reactions function as validation or 
invalidation of evaluative cognitions. Just as 
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people rely on their sensory experiences of 
seeing and hearing as evidence about reality, 
embodied experiences of affect can also be a 
source of evidence. The difference is that 
whereas sensory experiences are relevant to 
descriptive beliefs, affective experiences concern 
evaluative beliefs. In both cases, experience 
generally trumps cognition. Thus, if one believes 
it to be sunny but opens the door to find rain, the 
belief about sunshine quickly vanishes. 
Similarly, if one believes that eating cheesecake 
is bad but, on seeing a moist piece of cheesecake, 
experiences the idea of eating cheesecake as 
good, experience may again trump belief. 
Interestingly, the compelling experience in the 
latter case is self-generated rather than sensory. 
Being Moved 
The problem of embodiment can be seen as 
part of a larger mind-body problem and a larger 
problem of understanding. For example, 
psychotherapists discern whether clients 
understand the meanings of the insights they 
verbalize by noting whether they appear 
appropriately moved; whether their bodies, 
manners, and intonations register the 
implications of what they have said. An 
observation basic to our goal in this chapter is 
that just as others’ affective expressions inform 
us about them, our own subjective experiences of 
affect inform us about ourselves. However, 
because we ourselves produce our affective 
reactions, one might reasonably ask why we 
need to be informed. 
Of course, the answer is that like many other 
psychological processes, emotional appraisals 
take place largely outside of awareness. Thus in 
some respects, we are “strangers to ourselves” 
(Wilson, 2002). As a result, we accept that 
people can meaningfully ask themselves, “Who 
am I?” and in other ways seek self-knowledge. 
Therefore, people may find it useful to be 
informed by their embodied, affective reactions 
that they have encountered something good or 
bad. Indeed, we have argued that many 
evaluative judgments are made essentially by 
asking ourselves, “How do I feel about it?” 
(Schwarz & Clore, 1988). 
Decision-making too is apparently largely 
unconscious. Thus, Wegner (2002) argues that 
the belief that decisions arise from conscious 
deliberation is an illusion resulting from the fact 
that the mind both decides and produces relevant 
conscious experiences at the same time. A 
conviction that our conscious deliberations are 
the source of our decisions is therefore difficult 
to escape. But however compelling, such 
subjective experiences may not be the critical 
factor. Indeed, when making decisions, people 
often simply ruminate about alternatives until 
one of them announces itself as the right choice. 
In this view, the subjective experience of one 
alternative as particularly desirable is a reflection 
of having decided unconsciously. Of course, it is 
still we who decide, but our conscious 
deliberations may not be where the action is. 
Especially for big decisions, we expect to be 
informed by our affect. When choosing a spouse 
or buying a house, people expect their decision 
to be accompanied by embodied evidence. If one 
is lucky, one might be able to justify one’s 
choice by the experience of having instantly 
fallen in love with the person, apartment, 
college, or pair of shoes that one chooses. Such 
an experience confers great legitimacy on one’s 
decision because we accept that affective 
feelings are embodied information about what 
people want, like, and value. 
In fact, we rely so much on embodied affect 
as a source of information that its absence can 
also be informative. For example, a recent book 
by model and actress Brooke Shields (2005) 
described her experience of becoming a mother. 
As she held her new daughter, whose birth was 
the realization of a life-long dream, she was 
devastated to discover that she felt nothing at all. 
The baby in her arms seemed like an alien 
object. The absence of feelings of intimacy and 
nurturance, so basic to motherhood, suggested to 
her that she was a shallow and worthless person. 
She even considered suicide. Only after 
treatment for postpartum depression did the 
appropriate, embodied experiences arise to 
validate her more positive beliefs about herself. 
This process of embodied invalidation and 
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validation of beliefs about the self has been the 
subject of recent research in our laboratory, as 
described in the next section. 
The Cognitive Costs of Affective 
Invalidation 
 Affective Certainty 
In one series of studies (Tamir, Robinson, & 
Clore, 2002), we examined the idea that 
embodied affective reactions could serve as data 
for people’s theories about themselves. As a 
source of affective cues, we induced a happy or 
sad mood in individuals who had indicated that 
they believed themselves to be either high or low 
in trait positive affect, as measured by an 
extraversion scale. In each case, we found that 
whether a person’s momentary feelings helped or 
hurt their cognitive performance depended on 
whether the feelings supported or conflicted with 
their beliefs about being a happy or unhappy 
person. 
The mood induction procedure involved 
listening to happy (Mozart) or melancholy 
(Mahler) music. Participants then responded as 
quickly as possible to words (e.g., pain, failure, 
praise, gifts) by indicating whether a word 
referred to something desirable or undesirable. 
Decisions were faster when state and trait affect 
were both positive or both negative than when 
they differed. By itself, being happy conferred no 
advantage, regardless of whether it was trait or 
state happiness. In fact, individuals viewing 
themselves as generally unhappy were faster 
when also unhappy in the moment. The critical 
factor was then not the affect but its congruence 
with evaluative beliefs. 
Tamir et al. (2002) interpreted their results 
as demonstrating the benefits of “affective 
certainty,” which allowed participants to devote 
themselves fully to the task at hand. In contrast, 
affective uncertainty appeared to have saddled 
them with a secondary task, which slowed their 
reactions. This account is compatible with the 
general idea that affective experience can serve 
as evidence for affective beliefs. 
 Affect-as-Evidence 
The “affect-as-evidence” hypothesis (Clore 
& Gasper, 2000) holds that self-generated 
experiences of affect might serve as evidence of 
evaluative beliefs, just as sensory experiences 
routinely serve as evidence for descriptive 
beliefs about the world. For people who believe 
themselves to be happy individuals, feeling 
happy would provide evidence for that belief. 
For those who believe themselves to be unhappy 
persons, feeling unhappy would provide belief 
confirmation. The Tamir et al. (2002) results 
suggest that such confirmation leads to faster 
decisions. 
One alternative possible result for these 
experiments would have been for trait positive 
and negative affect to have made respondents 
especially sensitive to similarly valenced feelings 
(Gray, 1970, 1981). A second possibility would 
have been for a positive and negative mood to 
activate positive and negative concepts in 
memory, leading to faster reactions to similarly 
valenced stimuli (Bower, 1981; Isen, 1984; 
Forgas, 1995). Neither of these patterns emerged. 
Instead, in keeping with the “affective certainty” 
hypothesis proposed by Tamir et al. (2002), trait-
state congruence led to faster processing of all 
stimuli. According to that hypothesis, when 
embodied affect does not match affective beliefs 
about the self, the person is left with an 
epistemic problem, which may interfere with 
ongoing processing. 
In subsequent research, we examined further 
the idea that incongruence between affect and 
cognition has cognitive costs, and that affective 
reactions that are congruent promote cognitive 
effectiveness. This research expanded the 
question by examining memory, rather than 
reaction time, as a measure of cognitive 
efficiency, as described in the next section. 
 Affective Coherence 
“Affective coherence” refers to the 
compatibility of affective concepts and embodied 
experiences, and is believed to facilitate ongoing 
cognitive processing (Centerbar, Schnall, Clore, 
& Garvin, in press). In contrast, “affective 
incoherence” (incompatibility between 
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conceptual and embodied affect) should interfere 
with cognitive efficiency and fluency of 
processing. The conditions of affective 
coherence should tend to induce “affective 
certainty” and show effects similar to those 
observed by Tamir et al. (2002). Five 
experiments examined recall of a story about a 
series of happy and sad events that are recounted 
by the main character. The story consisted of 
happy events, such as “getting a bicycle for his 
birthday,” and sad events, such as “the day his 
dog died.” In each experiment, before reading 
the story participants completed a sentence 
unscrambling task designed to prime happy or 
sad concepts. Only the sources of the embodied 
affective cues differed across experiments. In 
one experiment, we induced mood by having 
participants listen to happy or sad music. In other 
experiments, such affective cues came from 
having participants contract the facial muscles 
involved in smiling or frowning. And in yet 
other experiments, they engaged in approach or 
avoidance actions by gently pulling up or 
pushing down on a desktop.  
 The results were the same in all 
experiments. When mood, facial expressions, or 
actions were appropriate to the valence of the 
primed cognitions, overall memory for the story 
was superior. When such embodied cues were 
incompatible with the valence of the primed 
happy or sad thoughts, memory suffered. Again, 
as in the reaction time data of Tamir et al. 
(2002), the effect was general, not specific to 
positive or negative items of information. Thus, 
the ability to remember well depends partly on 
the degree to which one’s current embodied 
affect agrees with one’s current evaluative 
thoughts. 
Similar results can be found in the emotion 
regulation literature. For example, Richards and 
Gross (2000) showed emotionally evocative film 
clips and asked some participants to inhibit any 
emotional expression. They found impaired 
memory in these individuals, and concluded that 
affective suppression hurts performance. 
However, such suppression also involves a 
mismatch between affective beliefs (about the 
film) and affective expressions of the same type 
as those examined above. Hence, the cognitive 
costs that appear to be due to the suppression of 
emotion could be due to the incongruence 
between emotional beliefs and neutral 
expressions, a possibility that has yet to be 
examined. 
 Enactment 
The hypothesis that there are costs to 
disagreeing with oneself turns out to have wide 
applicability. Other relevant data come from 
studies employing the Implicit Association Test 
(IAT) (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). 
In such studies, people’s verbally expressed 
beliefs about their attitudes (explicit attitudes) 
can be compared to behaviorally expressed 
attitudes (enacted attitudes). Evidence of the cost 
of disagreement between belief-based and 
enacted attitudes comes from a study of implicit 
versus explicit measures of erotic orientation 
(Vargas, 2004). 
The study involved exposure to photographs 
of same and opposite sex individuals and both 
belief-based and enacted (IAT) measures of how 
appealing participants found them. Vargas 
(2004) found that individuals whose explicit and 
implicit reactions to the pictures disagreed had 
elevated somatic symptoms and a reduced sense 
of well-being when compared to those whose 
concrete behavior (enacted attitudes) agreed with 
their beliefs about themselves (explicit attitudes). 
Here again, disagreeing with oneself appears to 
carry costs. 
Compatible results come from other studies 
assessing explicit and implicit self esteem 
(Robinson, Vargas, & Crawford, 2003). In these 
studies, disagreement between reported beliefs 
about oneself (explicit self esteem) and 
behavioral reactions to the self on the IAT was 
associated with being in a worse mood. This was 
true both in a laboratory assessment and when 
affect was assessed over time as part of a daily 
diary study. Even for individuals with low 
esteem, having their low esteem beliefs 
confirmed by enactments of low esteem on the 
IAT left them feeling marginally better than 
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having such beliefs disconfirmed. These 
experiments suggest that disagreement between 
believed and enacted attitudes can be costly 
emotionally as well as cognitively. It should be 
noted that we do not know to what extent these 
respondents developed an awareness of the 
attitudes they were enacting as they responded to 
the IAT. Therefore, we cannot be sure that the 
effects depended on the cognitive costs of 
affective uncertainty. However, people 
apparently often do experience some IAT 
conditions as harder than others and see their 
enactments as attitudinally disclosing. Indeed, 
Monteith, Voils, and Ashburn-Nardo (2001) 
used such experiences on the IAT as a guilt 
induction to promote compensatory responses. 
Other supportive data are less exclusively 
about embodiment, but are nevertheless 
noteworthy because they show the importance of 
agreement between general beliefs about oneself 
and concrete, experiential, or episodic data. As 
part of a formalized interview, investigators of 
attachment (e.g., Allen & Land, 1999) often ask 
adolescents to express their general beliefs about 
their relationship with their parents. In addition, 
they ask the adolescent for specific examples that 
would support their belief. It turns out that being 
unable to recall concrete instances that would 
support the adolescents’ abstract beliefs about 
having a good or bad relationship with their 
mothers or fathers is a powerful predictor of bad 
life outcomes (drug use, teen pregnancy, 
truancy). The investigators suggest that problems 
in everyday coping become magnified when 
children lack validation in the form of readily 
recallable experiences for such core beliefs as 
whether or not their parents love them. 
 Summary 
The data reviewed in this section concerned 
the congruence between general beliefs and 
specific embodiments, enactments, and 
experiences. They showed that incongruence has 
negative effects on decision speed, memory 
performance, and feelings of happiness, as well 
as on specific life outcomes. Our interpretation 
emphasized the idea that embodied cues that are 
incongruent with evaluative cognitions may be 
experienced as disconfirmation of those 
cognitions, creating an epistemic load that 
hinders performance. However, a question that 
arises is whether there is also evidence for the 
reverse, that is, is there evidence that cognitions 
accompanied by congruent embodied cues are 
more credible or powerful, rather than their 
incongruence making them less credible or 
powerful? Evidence comes from two sources. 
The first is evidence that congruence can 
influence how compelling or effective 
information is in a marketing context. The 
second consists of evidence of attitudinal effects 
from engaging in affectively coherent approach-
avoidance action. 
Affect-Confirmation 
Do embodied affective cues that are 
believed to serve as evidence for evaluative 
cognitions have any discernable impact on the 
effectiveness of such cognitions? Experiments by 
Adaval (2001) induced mood by having 
participants spend several minutes writing a 
description of a happy or sad personal 
experience. Afterward, they considered positive 
and negative information about various 
consumer goods and rated the appeal of the 
various products and their willingness to 
purchase them. Adaval discovered that when 
participants experienced affective feelings of the 
same valence as the positive or negative 
information they were considering about a 
product, that information then carried greater 
weight in the final judgments. She concluded 
that the embodied affective cues appeared to 
serve as confirmation or disconfirmation of the 
information. Her “affect-confirmation” 
interpretation is thus similar to the related 
proposals of “affect-as-evidence” (Clore & 
Gasper, 2000) and “affect certainty” (Tamir et 
al., 2002). Each of these hypotheses proposes 
that self-produced, affective reactions can 
provide evidence for, confirm, or increase 
confidence in affect-congruent beliefs. 
In addition to increasing the confidence that 
one has in congruent information, what else 
might follow from the experience of coherence 
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between body and mind? To the extent that body 
and mind are on the same page, we might expect 
what is in the mind to be processed with greater 
fluency. And because processing fluency has 
been shown to be inherently positive 
(Winkielman & Cacioppo, 2001), we might 
expect that mind-body coherence should result in 
more positive attitudes toward stimuli that are 
processed fluently. We review evidence on this 
point next. 
 Approach-Avoidance Action 
and Affect 
In a series of experiments, Centerbar and 
Clore (2006) examined the effects of engaging in 
arm flexion (as in approach) and arm extension 
(as in avoidance) while processing liked and 
disliked stimuli. The idea was that approach 
should be a motivationally congruent action 
toward liked objects and avoidance should be a 
motivationally congruent action toward disliked 
objects. In addition to validating the attitude 
toward the object, as shown in Centerbar et al. 
(2006), congruent actions should promote 
processing fluency and hence liking. 
The experiment consisted of viewing novel 
stimuli (Chinese ideographs) that had been rated 
for attractiveness. As each ideograph was shown 
on a computer screen, a participant either pressed 
gently down on a tabletop (arm extension) or up 
from the bottom of the tabletop (arm flexion). 
Subsequent evaluations of the ideographs 
showed that when such approach or avoidance 
action was motivationally congruent with initial 
liking for a particular ideograph, liking for that 
ideograph increased. When the action and liking 
for the object were motivationally incongruent, 
liking decreased. We infer that engaging in 
action that was motivationally congruent with 
the value of a particular ideograph increased the 
fluency with which that ideograph was 
processed, and engaging in action that was 
motivationally incongruent decreased the fluency 
with which that ideograph was processed. As a 
result, fluently processed ideographs received a 
small boost in liking relative to those processed 
with greater difficulty. These results are 
therefore consistent with Winkielman and 
Cacioppo’s (2001) finding that processing 
fluency is affectively positive (for further 
discussion of perceptual fluency, see Schwarz & 
Clore, 2007). 
Note that we previously cited Adaval’s 
(2001) finding in which embodied validation of 
product beliefs in a consumer context conferred 
greater weight on those beliefs in purchase 
decisions. In view of that finding, should we 
have expected more disliking (rather than more 
liking) when the enactment of avoidance 
confirmed participants’ dislike for certain 
ideographs? The answer is no, because Adaval 
found that the embodied confirmation of 
negative product beliefs changed only their 
weighting and not their value. Hence, we did not 
expect an enactment of avoidance to make 
disliked ideographs more negative. Rather, the 
experience of fluency from affective coherence 
(both from avoiding disliked ideographs and 
from approaching liked ideographs) was 
expected to add a small positive value, making 
both seem slightly more likable, which is what 
was found. The obtained effect is analogous to 
what Higgins (2000) has referred to as “value 
from fit.” It is worth noting that the effect was 
(and was expected to be) small, so that its impact 
was apparent only for mildly unappealing 
ideographs. 
 Summary 
The similarity of results across repeated 
studies (Centerbar & Clore, 2006) indicated that 
there is positive value in affective coherence. 
Specifically, positive value increased, as 
indicated by increased liking, when enactments 
of approach validated pre-existing liking. 
Importantly, the same increase in liking appeared 
when enactments of avoidance validated 
perceptions of lack of appeal. Thus, the increase 
in value is one of affective coherence, which in 
this case was the experience of having one’s 
initial liking or disliking confirmed by finding 
oneself engaging in motivationally congruent 
actions. 
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The phenomena under consideration concern 
the role of embodied and enacted reactions as 
evidence for evaluative cognitions and beliefs. 
Whereas sensory data can validate descriptive 
beliefs, we cannot see, hear, or touch the 
goodness or badness that is the content of 
evaluative beliefs. Instead, evidence must be 
self-generated in the form of our own affective 
feelings, expressions, and actions. Such 
embodied reactions do not in turn need 
verification, as the compelling nature of such 
reactions make them the data of choice. 
The discussion has focused on embodiment 
as data for cognition rather than on cognition as 
embodied. Before proceeding, it is important to 
clarify the implications of these results for the 
larger idea of embodied cognition. On the one 
hand, they support the hypothesis that 
embodiment plays a critical, epistemic role. But 
on the other, they also show constraints on how 
we should think about embodiment, the issue to 
which we turn next. 
Implications for Embodied 
Cognition 
An important conclusion of the experiments 
just reviewed (Centerbar & Clore, 2006) was 
that, contrary to popular belief, enactment by 
itself did not affect attitude. The role of 
enactment was to confirm or disconfirm existing 
perceptions and cognitions of value. This point is 
of great relevance for achieving a viable 
conception of embodied cognition. 
Discussions of embodiment and social 
psychology (e.g., Niedenthal, Barsalou, 
Winkielman, Krauth-Gruber, & Ric, 2005; Smith 
& Semin, 2004) invariably begin by citing 
findings of direct links between action and 
affect. For example, Smith and Semin (2004, p. 
26) state that: 
 Consistent with the embodiment assumption, 
recent work in social psychology… underlines the close 
connections of attitudes to sensori-motor systems and 
therefore to our bodies. For instance… horizontal or 
vertical head movements… (Wells & Petty, 1980) and… 
flexion and extension of the upper arm… influence 
evaluative judgments (e.g., Cacioppo, Priester, & 
Berntson, 1993). 
Expositions of the simulation view have 
also highlighted these findings as prime evidence 
for embodiment (e.g., Niedenthal et al., 2005). In 
this section, we review evidence suggesting that 
the inferences we psychologists usually draw 
from these studies may need reconsidering. First, 
we examine the impact of approach-avoidance 
action on attitudes toward Chinese ideographs, 
revisiting a study described in the previous 
section. 
 Do Actions Cause Attitudes? 
The research on the effect of approach-
avoidance actions on the liking of ideographs 
discussed previously (Centerbar & Clore, 2006) 
was adapted from the often-cited research by 
Cacioppo et al. (1993). In an elegant series of 
studies, Cacioppo and colleagues found that 
engaging in approach (arm flexion) or avoidance 
(arm extension) created rudimentary attitudes 
toward novel stimuli (Chinese ideographs). The 
paper is admirably thorough and careful. 
Nevertheless, we revisited the issue, and 
happened onto an interesting discovery, as 
described previously. When one takes into 
account differences among the ideographs in 
how appealing they are, one finds that rather than 
acting directly, such action interacts with the 
value of the object being approached or avoided. 
Using Cacioppo et al.’s (1993) original 
ideographs, we found that the effect of approach-
avoidance action depended completely on the 
initial liking of the ideographs. Thus, the 
increase in liking as a result of the approach 
action and the decrease in liking from the 
avoidance action held only for ideographs that 
were initially liked. For ideographs that were 
initially disliked, the results were reversed so 
that approach reduced liking and avoidance 
created liking. Also, in response to neutral 
ideographs, approach and avoidance had no 
effects on liking. Thus, the attitudinal effect does 
not lie in the actions themselves. 
The original results of Cacioppo et al. 
(1993) appear to have resulted from a sample of 
ideographs that were more liked than disliked, so 
that on balance approach had positive and 
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avoidance had negative effects. Our results thus 
expand on their initial findings and suggest that 
Heider (1958) may have been correct when he 
observed that approach-avoidance motions may 
not have any affective implications out of 
context. It appears that the attitude effect arises 
not from approach-avoidance action itself but 
from the congruence between the liking implied 
by the action and pre-existing liking. The 
affective coherence of engaging in actions that 
validate one’s attitude is a positive experience 
that creates liking, whereas the affective 
incoherence of engaging in actions that 
invalidate one’s attitude is a negative experience 
that creates dislike. 
The notion that motor action requires 
context to acquire meaning and have impact is 
intended to be highly general. The argument is 
that in our search for compelling examples of 
embodiment in cognition, we may be 
insufficiently attentive to the fact that the 
meaning of actions, like that of other 
psychologically significant stimuli, is embedded, 
situated, and emergent (Smith & Semin, 2004). 
This point is illustrated for expressive action in 
an additional series of studies. 
Expression and Affect 
To examine the effects of expressive action 
on affect, a series of experiments varied the 
context in which expressive actions were 
observed or enacted (Tamir, Robinson, Clore, 
Martin, & Whitaker, 2004). The findings 
confirmed the idea that expressive actions can 
contribute to affective reactions, but in none of 
the experiments was the influence direct. In each, 
the direction of the effect depended again on the 
context in which it appeared. 
For example, one set of experiments 
assessed the affective influence of shaking one’s 
head while processing information, in a manner 
similar to what Wells and Petty (1980) had done 
in their classic experiments. Specifically, 
participants engaged in head shaking as they 
watched a short film and then indicated their 
reactions to the characters. One of the films 
showed an interview with a convict who had 
murdered a young girl in a psychotic delusion. 
In the film, the convict argues that he is perfectly 
fine and should be set free. Head shaking while 
watching the psychotic killer assert his 
harmlessness increased the angry feelings of 
participants’ and increased their tendencies to 
see him as responsible for his actions. However, 
the very same head shaking action produced the 
reverse effect when the film showed a pregnant 
young heroin addict explaining her sad situation. 
Head shaking in that context increased viewers’ 
sympathy rather than their anger. It acted like a 
form of agreement about the sadness of her 
plight, rather than as an impetus to blame. The 
effects of this expressive action were therefore 
totally contingent on the context, rather than 
being direct and context-independent. Another 
study in this series examined the effects of brow 
tension on decisional confidence. Again, the 
effects reversed depending on the contextual 
variable that was manipulated. 
In an essay entitled, “Of Men and 
Mackerels,” Dijksterhuis, Bargh, and Miedema 
(2000) proposed that expressive effects have 
automatic and invariable effects on affect, 
judgment, and behavior. They maintained that 
expressive cues have fixed influences that people 
can minimize only by exercising conscious 
control. To assess this claim, Tamir et al. (2004) 
presented smiles subliminally during a 
competitive game. Despite the fact that the 
smiles were presented unconsciously, flashing 
them during the scoring of participants’ 
performances resulted in positive feelings and 
beliefs that they had performed well. Conversely, 
flashing the subliminal smiles during the scoring 
of their opponents’ performance resulted in 
negative feelings and beliefs on the part of 
participants that they had not done very well. 
The results again indicate that expressions 
do not have fixed, invariable, effects. Moreover, 
this result was obtained despite the fact that 
participants’ lack of awareness of the smiles 
would have prevented them from engaging in the 
type of cognitive control that had been 
hypothesized as necessary to counter the 
obligatory link between expression and affect. 
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Instead, the results show that the affective 
influences of the smiles depended on the context 
in which they appeared. 
Earlier theorizing by Zajonc and Markus 
(1984) had suggested a “hard interface” between 
muscular responses and affect that did not 
involve cognitive processing. However, our own 
results were more consistent with proposals by 
Darwin (1872/1965), who emphasized that 
expressions amplify emotions. He did not hold 
that expressions cause emotions, as some have 
assumed. Thus, we concur with Tamir et al. 
(2004) in the conclusion that emotions emerge 
not from the muscles but from the mind. 
In summary, the expressive action studies 
(Tamir et al., 2004) and the approach-avoidance 
action studies (Centerbar & Clore, 2006) lead to 
similar conclusions. They expand the important 
findings of Wells and Petty (1980) and of 
Cacioppo et al. (1993) to show the sometimes 
hidden role of context. In both, the same actions 
had opposite consequences when the mental 
context was altered. If these results are any 
guide, we should expect that embodied meaning, 
no less than lexical meaning, depends on the 
context in which it appears. The results are 
consistent with an emphasis on the situated 
nature of social cognition (Smith & Semin, 
2004), whether embodied or not, and they are 
inconsistent with views that assume that 
embodied stimuli have direct and unmediated 
effects (e.g., Dijksterhuis et al., 2000; Zajonc & 
Markus, 1984). 
A similar analysis can be applied to related 
results, including those from the clever and often 
cited study by Strack, Martin, and Stepper 
(1988). In this study, participants held a pencil in 
their mouths as they viewed cartoons. By 
varying whether the pencil was held by the lips 
or the teeth, participants contracted muscles that 
either facilitated or inhibited a smile. They found 
that flexing the muscles involved in smiling 
increased enjoyment of cartoons. The experiment 
thus showed that expressions can intensify affect 
but not, as often assumed, that they create affect. 
That is, they showed that in the context of 
looking at cartoons, smiling increases 
enjoyment, not that such muscle action has a 
direct or context-free impact on affect. The data 
are not evidence for a hard interface, but they are 
important evidence that engaging in affect-
congruent action can validate or intensify 
affective meaning. 
Evaluative Embodiment in Everyday 
Life 
We have presented evidence of some 
detrimental effects of incongruent bodily cues 
and some positive effects of congruent bodily 
cues. The positive effects included greater 
impact of verbal information when accompanied 
by congruent embodiment (Adaval, 2001), and 
increased liking of visual stimuli when 
participants engaged in approach during positive 
stimuli and avoidance during negative stimuli. 
This effect was believed to result from more 
fluent processing during preference-congruent 
action (Centerbar & Clore, 2006). 
These experiments involved the promotion 
of particular evaluative beliefs by manipulating 
congruent embodiments. Similar attempts at 
influence are frequently encountered in everyday 
life. For example, banks have traditionally been 
large buildings with stone columns and great 
stone facades that give the impression of solidity 
and safety. Bankers presumably created such 
impressive structures in hopes that the physical 
solidity of massive stone structures would 
provide compelling, experiential evidence for the 
abstract idea of financial solidity. Subsequently, 
when the safety and solidity of banks was 
generally assumed, the architecture changed 
accordingly to send a new message. Thus, 
neighborhood branches of modern banks have 
eliminated the formality of steps and columns 
and the coldness of marble and granite to 
emphasize accessibility, openness, and 
friendliness. But the process is the same. 
Architecture is chosen to embody, and hence to 
validate in the subjective experiences of potential 
customers, whatever ideas about the bank are 
promoted in advertising. In this way, they seek 
(literally) to achieve a concrete representation of 
a desired brand image. 
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A technique readily apparent in government 
buildings and memorials is to use physical 
elevation to elicit the idea of greatness. Thus, the 
Lincoln Memorial is an imposing structure atop 
many stone steps. Lincoln himself is rendered in 
an enormous, awe-inspiring statue intended to 
reflect our national beliefs about his greatness. 
Congress too is housed in an impressive building 
with many steps to convey the high calling of the 
legislature. In courtrooms too, judges are 
elevated physically so that our experiences of 
their physical elevation might validate beliefs in 
their elevated judgment. The importance of 
elevation can perhaps be appreciated by 
imagining judges rendering their decisions from 
the depths of a pit instead of from an elevated 
bench. 
Of course, the world of advertising is full of 
attempts to instill experiences relevant to 
whatever beliefs advertisers are employed to 
promote. Advertisers generally try to convey 
claims and create validating experiences within 
the same brief ad. Using music, images, and film 
techniques that have no actual bearing on the 
product itself, advertisers seek to elicit 
excitement, feelings of elegance, purity, 
sensuality, or whatever affect the product 
message requires. If successful, experiences are 
generated that are instinctively compelling so 
that they function as evidence for the belief 
being promulgated. A potential benefit of this 
process for product producers is that once the 
desired beliefs about the product have been 
validated in this way, it may no longer be 
necessary for actual experience with the product 
itself to provide such validation. 
Research 
A series of studies has examined such 
embodied and experiential analogies in the 
laboratory. One set of experiments examined the 
experience of lightness and darkness as a 
universal metaphor for goodness and badness, 
and whether it might facilitate the processing of 
evaluative concepts. The experiments involved 
the presentation on a computer screen of 
evaluative words in light- or dark-colored fonts 
(Meier, Robinson, & Clore, 2004). The 
participants’ task was to classify the words as 
positive or negative as quickly as possible. In 
many experiments, it was clear that evaluations 
could be made more rapidly when positive words 
appeared in a bright font and negative words 
appeared in a dark font compared to the reverse 
pattern. Moreover, the rapid stimulus 
presentations and response times involved 
suggested that, at least in the context of making 
evaluations, the facilitation and interference 
effects were more or less automatic. 
A second series of experiments examined a 
related physical metaphor for evaluation – 
vertical location (Meier & Robinson, 2004). In 
these studies, words were evaluated as positive 
or negative after they were presented either at the 
top or the bottom of a computer screen. The 
results showed faster evaluations when positive 
words appeared at the top and negative words 
appeared at the bottom than when the words and 
positions had the reverse pattern. Together, these 
studies indicate that physical analogies for 
goodness and badness, in the form of lightness 
versus darkness and of high versus low 
elevation, promote fluent processing of 
affectively congruent cognitions compared to 
affectively incongruent cognitions. 
Embodiment in Art 
An approach to characterizing emotion, 
which may be useful in thinking about art, sees 
emotion as an affective state (Clore & Ortony, 
2000). The “affect” part simply means that 
emotions are about evaluation, but the “state” 
part implies that emotions involve multiple 
systems that simultaneously register the same 
thing. An emotion then emerges when multiple 
evaluative representations are too similar to keep 
track of separately and too different to combine. 
The resulting multidimensional representation is 
an emotional state. Such emergence occurs only 
as the information from multiple sources 
coheres. Something analogous seems to operate 
in some works of art. Both emotions and artistic 
forms that trade in emotions involve multiple 
modes of evaluation. Thus, poets employ 
connotation, imagery, metaphor, symbol, 
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repetition, and rhythm to create a single 
experience in readers (Perrine, 1956). With 
economy of language, the poet seeks multiple, 
partially redundant ways to represent themes 
both cognitively and experientially. Through 
multimodal representations of the same idea at 
the same time, ineffable but compelling 
experiences may be created. 
One of the things that graphic artists 
frequently do is to use lightness, darkness, and 
vertical location (the dimensions examined in the 
studies described previously) as well as other 
physical metaphors to instill their 
conceptualization in people’s experiences. The 
power of artists’ ideas often depends on whether 
their portrayal, depiction, or enactment is 
effective in eliciting embodied reactions in 
audiences. We have suggested that doing so may 
require multiple, partially redundant 
representations. Of course, each additional 
elaboration of the theme that is attempted carries 
with it the risk of inadvertently creating some 
affective incoherence, which would dissolve the 
emergent state. In the next section, we turn to 
Renaissance art for examples of successful 
attempts to use art to create emotional 
experiences. In addition, we consider an example 
in which Leonardo da Vinci also knowingly 
created incoherence in the service of inducing 
embodied involvement in viewers of his work. 
Perspective in Renaissance Art 
From the 4th to the 14th century or so, the 
Byzantine style of painting generally involved 
two-dimensional depictions that lacked any 
sense of depth. Painters depicted formalized 
spiritual themes with flat, archetypal figures. 
They were typically rendered rigidly, 
symmetrically, without depth or proper 
proportions, and without expression or 
individuality. 
Beginning with Giotto, figures in later 
works became more rounded and realistic, and 
were often engaged in action. They were more 
likely to be expressive, to look directly at the 
viewer, and to be painted with shadows and 
depth. One of the great advances of Italian 
Renaissance art (1300–1500) was the 
development of perspective to create a sense of 
depth. 
In contrast to earlier flat representations, 
Renaissance painters were capable of pulling 
viewers into the scenes they painted, giving them 
greater potential to elicit affective reactions 
appropriate to the themes of adoration and awe 
they sought to depict. In addition, because 
perspective involves an infinite vanishing point, 
it also served as a religious metaphor for the 
abstract infinity of God. As commented by 
Kubovy (1986), “Perspective often enabled the 
Renaissance artist to cast the deeply religious 
contents of his art in a form that could produce in 
the viewer spiritual effects that could not have 
been achieved by any other formal means.” (Part 
XI, p. 4). 
The research described previously (Meier et 
al., 2004; Meier & Robinson, 2004) found a 
relationship between people’s evaluative 
inclinations and both the lightness of color and 
the vertical position in which something appears. 
The development of perspective allowed 
Renaissance and later Baroque painters to exploit 
this relationship. The technique is abundantly 
evident on the walls and ceilings of Italian 
churches, cathedrals, and museums. Painting in 
perspective enabled viewers to look up through 
clouds and the ascending angels to radiant holy 
figures. The arms and legs and the drape of their 
garments give the feel of these figures rising 
upward to grace and light. Surely for believers 
and pilgrims of the time, even more than for us, 
they were inspiring. Of course, there were also 
paintings of the damned, showing them 
descending into the darkness of the lower depths. 
The viewer can thus experience the elevation and 
lightness of the good and the lowering and 
darkening of the bad, even though both are 
simply paint applied to flat surfaces. In that 
context, the power of perspective lay in its ability 
to create embodied experiences consistent with 
ideas about the glory and sweetness of the good 
and the pain and dread of the bad. The embodied 
affective experiences engendered by this new 
technique presumably served to validate the 
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evaluative ideas depicted, so that perspective 
became a powerful tool of persuasion. 
 
One particularly interesting application of 
the “good-is-up” principle can be seen in 
Leonardo da Vinci’s fresco, “The Last Supper.” 
The work shows ample use of perspective 
techniques, which da Vinci understood and 
promulgated in written advice to artists of his 
day. He said a cardinal principle was that to be 
convincing, the center of projection where 
everything converges must be at the viewer’s 
eye. However, Kubovy (1986) points out that in 
this famous fresco, da Vinci violated his own 
principle. An analysis of the work shows clearly 
that the center of projection was not the viewer’s 
eye but a point 15 feet above the viewer. 
According to Kubovy (1986), this violation of 
principle was motivated. To accommodate to the 
center of projection above them, viewers are 
forced to adopt an elevated perspective. Being 
forced to consider the painting from a higher 
perspective means that viewing it is quite 
literally an uplifting experience (to learn more, 
see http://webexhibits.org/arrowintheeye). 
 
 In this section, we proposed that art is 
one domain in which an effort is often made to 
induce the body to aid the mind in a manner 
similar to that proposed in the embodiment 
hypothesis. An emotional cycle presumably 
characterizes some artistic projects such that an 
artist’s horror at war or a poet’s experience of 
love impels them to create works that elicit 
related responses both to convey an idea and to 
validate it. The driving force would seem to be a 
symbiosis between ideas represented in mind and 
body. Paintings from the Italian Renaissance 
were used as examples of attempts to create 
embodied responses that realized abstract ideas 
about good, evil, divinity, and infinity. 
Affective Accounting 
This concluding section proposes a 
particular set of conditions that may underlie the 
process whereby multiple sources of affect and 
evaluative meaning converge and become potent. 
Much of our work looks at how people succeed 
and fail in emotional bookkeeping (Schwarz & 
Clore, 1983). For example, in depression one’s 
negative affect becomes unaccountable. With no 
clear cause in view, the affect becomes 
promiscuous, attaching itself to anything and 
everything. The source of any experience may be 
clear when experienced by itself, but the 
experience may become less accountable when 
two causes produce similar experiences at the 
same time. 
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This process is evident in the domain of 
visual experience. In vision, different but highly 
redundant images are presented by the two eyes. 
Our eyes move together so that the images that 
are projected are almost, but not quite, the same. 
Indeed, they are so similar that visual accounting 
fails. It is impossible to keep books on which eye 
is contributing which image. As a result, we see 
an emergent three-dimensional image rather than 
separate, flat images from each eye. We see 
objects in hologram-like reality as both eyes 
provide parallel but slightly different images of 
the same thing. Presumably, such emergence 
reflects the fact that it is computationally simpler 
to see one object as “out there” rather than 
keeping track of two highly redundant sensory 
streams. 
A related principle appears to operate when 
we apprehend more than one type of goodness or 
badness simultaneously emanating from a single 
object. According to one theory of emotion 
(Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988), there are three 
different types of affect – being pleased at 
outcomes, approving of actions, and the liking of 
objects or their attributes. These reflect the 
appraisals of outcome desirability, the praise-
blameworthiness of actions, and the appeal of 
objects. Finally, these appraisals emanate from 
different sources of evaluation – goals, 
standards, and tastes. Specific emotions are then 
elaborations of these three types of good. The 
important point for the present purpose is that the 
three types of affect and evaluation are 
incommensurate. That is, although utility, 
morality, and beauty (examples of the three 
sources of value) are all good, it is not possible 
to add them up in any sensible way. Something 
that manifests all three is simply experienced as 
something unaccountably, multidimensionally 
wonderful. Consider a political leader whose 
policies are good in a utilitarian sense, who also 
engages in admirable actions, and who is 
additionally handsome and well-spoken. Such a 
figure may command a degree of loyalty that 
none of these attributes by themselves would 
have elicited, in part because of the difficulty of 
keeping straight what aspects of our experience 
of goodness comes from what source. As a 
result, the leader may be experienced as 
transcendentally good. 
Through a similar process, people fall in 
love, not only because their beloved helps in the 
satisfaction of their goals, but also because they 
may be seen as excellent or admirable in some 
way and because they may seem beautiful or 
handsome. The emergent experience of their 
goodness becomes, in fact, beyond accounting. 
Falling in love thus renders some people 
inarticulate, whereas it inspires others to poetry. 
Both reactions may flow from the same 
impossibility of sorting out which aspects of 
one’s fascination with the other are accounted for 
by which aspects of their goodness. 
There are many such emergent experiences 
that may arise for similar reasons. Thus, the 
experience of nostalgia may be one in which one 
experiences oneself in the present remembering 
something in the past, feeling at once the 
immediacy of a sweet memory of an event at the 
same time that one is experiencing the sadness of 
its distance in time. Similarly, an intimate 
conversation or romantic encounter may seem 
important not only because it may be intense, but 
perhaps also because one constructs from the 
visual, verbal, and nonverbal feedback from the 
other a model of their experience at the same 
time that one entertains one’s own view. To the 
extent that partial redundancy blurs clear 
accounting, a joint experience may emerge. The 
process is also seen in an operatic duet or a string 
quartet. Rather than hearing only music from 
separate players, a new entity emerges in one’s 
experience that transcends their individual 
contributions. In the interpersonal situation, such 
convergence may be experienced as a vital entity 
that is somehow more than each person’s input. 
Couples often point to such experiences as the 
moment in which they fell in love. Are such 
experiences illusions? Perhaps no more so than 
three-dimensional images are illusions. 
Failures of emotional accounting, just like 
those of visual accounting, allow one to 
experience multiple facets of the same person, 
place, or event at the same time. In the emotional 
case, the different sources of good are 
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incommensurate. They must remain separate but 
because they emanate from the same entity and 
are apprehended at the same time, no such 
separate accounting is possible. As a result, a 
multifaceted new entity with all of the 
incommensurate but redundant features is 
experienced as one emergent reality, the whole 
of which seems greater than the sum of its parts 
–  which, of course, it is. 
Conclusions 
We started this chapter with Sartre’s famous 
dictum, “Existence precedes and rules essence.” 
Like Sartre, we have argued for a situated view 
of psychological reality (see also Smith & 
Semin, 2004). In this view, the meaning of 
abstract ideas lies ultimately in how they are 
situated, instantiated, and exemplified. We 
focused in particular on evaluative ideas and 
their affective embodiment. We noted that when 
accompanied by affective reactions, they are 
made believable and persuasive because such 
affect indicates one’s commitment to the 
evaluation being entertained. Indeed, because 
they involve multiple systems, emotions have 
been viewed (Clore & Gasper, 2000) as 
commitments to particular realities. For example, 
once angry, one is no longer entertaining the 
possibility of injustice; rather, anger is an 
embodied commitment to the apparent reality of 
injustice. In related ways, all types of affective 
embodiments, including feelings, expressions, 
and actions can serve as evidence that makes 
persuasive the belief that one has encountered 
something good or bad. 
In this chapter, we made eight basic points, 
which may be summarized as follows: 
1. Embodied and enacted affective reactions 
can function to validate or invalidate evaluative 
cognitions. Specifically, the valence component 
of affect can provide evidence of evaluative 
ideas and the arousal component provides 
evidence of their importance. Especially when 
making big decisions, people expect to be 
informed by their affect, and the absence of 
supporting affect may be distressing and lead to 
unstable decisions. 
2. When embodied affective cues do not 
match current evaluative beliefs, the person may 
be left with an epistemic problem, which can 
then interfere with ongoing processing. 
Consistent with this “affect-as-evidence” view, 
Tamir et al. (2002) found slower reaction times 
among individuals whose momentary affective 
feelings were incongruent with their general 
affective beliefs about themselves. For example, 
people who thought of themselves as unhappy 
individuals performed better when they were sad 
than when they were happy. Other studies 
(Centerbar et al., in press) showed poorer 
memory performance when embodied affect 
(expressions, feelings, actions) did not match 
primed happy or sad concepts. 
3. Evidence of the generality of these 
proposals came from research using the IAT. 
Failures of affective enactments on the IAT to 
confirm explicit evaluations were shown to result 
in elevated symptoms and lowered mood. 
Attachment research (e.g., Allen & Land, 1999) 
also finds poorer life outcomes among 
adolescents whose specific, episodic memories 
fail to support their general evaluative beliefs 
about their relationships with their parents. 
Again, affective coherence was important 
independent of the positive or negative nature of 
the affect and evaluation involved. 
4. We proposed that congruent embodied 
cues should make congruent cognitions more 
credible or powerful. In studies of consumer 
preference (Adaval, 2001) and approach-
avoidance motor action (Centerbar & Clore, 
2006), congruence between evaluative cognitions 
and embodied and enacted affective cues made 
the cognitions potent. 
5. The impact of expressions and enactments 
of affect turn out to depend on the context in 
which they appear. Despite appropriate cautions 
by the authors, discussions of embodied 
cognition invariably cite studies of facial 
expression (Strack et al., 1988), head nods 
(Wells & Petty, 1980), and approach-avoidance 
action (Cacioppo et al., 1993) as evidence of 
direct and unmediated effects of motor action on 
affect and attitude. However, research varying 
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the context of these enactments (Centerbar & 
Clore, 2006; Tamir et al., 2004) has shown that 
such interpretations are unwarranted. The 
conclusions are consistent with an emphasis on 
the situated nature of social cognition (Smith & 
Semin, 2004) and inconsistent with views that 
assume that embodied stimuli have direct and 
unmediated effects (e.g., Dijksterhuis et al., 
2000; Zajonc & Markus, 1984). 
6. The promotion of evaluative beliefs 
through congruent embodiments can be seen in 
public architecture where the evaluative 
implications of light and dark colors and elevated 
physical locations are employed in the design of 
monuments and public buildings. The world of 
advertising too is full of attempts to instill 
experiences relevant to the beliefs to be 
promoted. Laboratory research was presented 
showing faster reactions when the evaluative 
meanings of words were supported by appearing 
in light or dark fonts (Meier et al., 2004) or by 
appearing on the top or bottom of a computer 
screen (Meier & Robinson, 2004). 
7. The research presented can be interpreted 
as evidence of the costs of embodiment and 
enactment that is incongruent with evaluative 
beliefs. For evidence of possible benefits of 
congruent embodiment, we turned to art. We 
suggested that the power of poems, paintings, 
and plays often depends on eliciting embodied 
reactions that are congruent with the ideas being 
purveyed. The use of perspective in Renaissance 
and Baroque painting illustrates one way of 
fostering experiences of elevation and awe when 
depicting religious scenes. Kubovy (1986) 
argued that Leonardo da Vinci knowingly 
created incoherence by making the perspective in 
his fresco, “The Last Supper,” converge above 
viewers to create visual and hence spiritual 
elevation. 
8. We concluded by noting that artistic and 
commercial exploitation of these principles 
ultimately rests on a failure of affective 
accounting. We have only one window on our 
affective experiences, making it impossible to 
keep straight which part of our affective 
reactions comes from which source (Schwarz & 
Clore, 1983). One’s experience can transcend 
the individual components when their partial 
redundancy makes appropriate experiential 
bookkeeping impossible, as when listening to an 
operatic duet or a string quartet. We argued that 
this difficulty contributes to all sorts of profound 
experiences, including art, religious revelation, 
political loyalty, and romantic love. 
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